A better set of …nancial institutions enables …rm access to external …nance with less consequent distortion of …rm policies, such as investment, entry and exit policies. At the limit, there is no distortion. In contrast, there are many di¤erent ways that a poor set of …nancial institutions may distort …rm policies. I consider how the transition towards better …nancial development depends on the type of poor …nancial development initially present. I develop a model in which …rm dynamics, including entry, investment and exit, are a¤ected by …nancial development. I contrast the transition to a …nancial system with no distortions from two initial states, one with restricted use of external …nance by …rms (e.g., credit constraints) and the other with lax use of external …nance by …rms (e.g., during a bubble). I highlight substantial di¤er-ences in …rm dynamics, including patterns of entry and price levels, across these two transitions towards better …nancial development.
Introduction
The e¤ect of …nancial institutions on …rm dynamics and industry growth has received growing attention. In particular, the e¤ect of a poor set of …nancial institutions on …rm size and growth, and the e¤ect on …rms of an improvement in …nancial institutions. One question this raises is what constitutes a poor set of …nancial institutions. A straightforward starting point is to consider what a good set of …nancial institutions are: this will be an institutional arrangement that results in …rm policy decisions not being distorted by the issues relating to access to external …nance. For instance, in the typical industrial organization models with no …nancial sector the assumption is just this: the …rm has access to external funds needed to fund valuable projects.
A more complicated consideration is what constitutes poor …nancial development. A major focus has been on issues that limit provision of external …nance to …rms. The basis underlying problems emphasized are weak external investor rights (e.g., as in Hart and Moore (1994)) or information asymmetry (e.g., as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) ). In particular, one stream of literature has focused on how credit constraints are consistent with empirical patterns of …rm growth and size.
Theoretically, credit constraints are able to explain the within-industry patterns of how …rm growth and exit vary with …rm age and size, as well as the evolution of …rm …nancial structure (Cooley and Quadrini (2001), Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) , Clementi and Hopenhayn (2002) ). Limited access to external …nance constrains the growth of …rms that would prefer to grow at a rate requiring more …nancial resources than the cash ‡ow generated by the …rm's current activities. In the theoretical models …rms that grow to a su¢ cient size typically cease to have dependence on external …nance, as the funds generated from current internal activities are su¢ cient to fund future activities. Also, there is empirical evidence that is consistent with smaller, younger …rms having their growth limited by poor access to external …nance (Beck et. al. (2005) , and Cabral and Mata (2003) ). Also, estimates of costs to access external …nance indicate substantial costs, and that these costs are more substantial for smaller …rms (Hennessy and Whited (2007) .
Motivated by these same basic issues of property rights and information sharing, another stream of literature has provided empirical evidence on the extent to which cross-country di¤erences in development of …nancial institutions limits industry growth (Rajan and Zingales (1998) However, poor …nancial development may distort …nancing to …rms not only by limiting funding but by providing too much …nancing. That is, the terms o¤ered to …rms may be too lax inducing the …rm to access more external …nance than the …rm would if there were a good set of …nancial institutions. One situation in which this occurs is during speculative periods, for instance, as in Japan in the late 1980s, during the Asia crisis of the late 1990s, during the internet boom in the late 1990s, and recently in the U.S. credit market (Kroszner et. at. (2007) , Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)) Another situation is where, potentially for just certain sectors, governments provide subsidies and other guarantees that lower the cost of external …nance (Gual (1999) ).
This raises the issue of how di¤erent is the transition from a poor to a good …nancial system, given that there are many di¤erent ways in which a poor …nancial system may distort provision of external …nance to …rms. In this paper I focus on how di¤erent are …rm dynamics during the transition from a situation with restricted access to external …nance to a situation with undistorted access to external …nance, as compared to the transition from a situation with lax access to external …nance to a situation with undistorted access to external …nance. In e¤ect, how do the starting points a¤ect the transition. This issue is complementary to the literature that has tended to focus on just the transition from restricted to undistorted.
My contribution is to develop a model in which …rm dynamics are a¤ected by the degree of …nancial development and that allows for di¤erent types of poor …nancial development, in particular both restricted and lax access to external …nance. In the model, the degree of …nancial development a¤ects the cost of external …nance. This shapes …rm policies, as …rms jointly decide the investment, to increase …rm capital stock, and …nancing, including dividend payout, retention of earnings in the …rm, and access to external funding Hence, the model connects institutional cost of external …nance to internal …rm …nancial and investment decisions. This connection is also inter-temporally consistent, re ‡ecting the …rm's expectations of the future evolution of …rm characteristics, such as productivity, and costs to access external …nance. Also, the model is one of heterogeneous …rms within an industry, and hence each …rm's policy decision are a¤ected by the policy choices of other …rms in the industry.
I …nd the transition from restricted to undistorted access to external …nance is very di¤erent to the transition from lax to undistorted access to external …nance. Major di¤erences in …rm policies are evident in how …rm entry and exit decisions change over time: in particular, the extent to which entry and exit is a¤ected in anticipation of or after a change in …nancial development.
Also, the evolution of average industry price and the number of …rms over the short-term period immediately around the change in cost of external …nance is not necessarily indicative of the long run change. These e¤ects highlight the empirical challenge that the e¤ects of a change in …nancial development may not only be concurrent with the change in …nancial development. Also, the e¤ect of an improvement in …nancial development is highly heterogeneous across …rms in the industry: this provides support for arguments of how political economy considerations may shape the development of …nancial institutions.
Thus the transition to an improved degree of …nancial development involves complex dynamic e¤ects due to the …rm simultaneously deciding …nancing and investment policies at each point in time that are consistent with the …rm's future expectations of, for instance, costs to access external …nance. To address this situation, I build a model with heterogeneous …rms that incorporates both idiosyncratic …rm uncertainty (future productivity is stochastic) and forward looking investment decisions subject to sunk costs and access to external …nance. The simultaneous consideration of external …nancing, liquidity, and investment policies is consistent with recent literature (Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) ) building on earlier literature on the link between …nancial constraints and investment (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) , Kaplan and Zingales (1997) ). The importance of considering the …rm's polices in a dynamic setting have been highlighted, as …rms policies re ‡ect future expectations of investment opportunities and costs to access external …nance (Titman and Tsyplakov (2007) , and Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2006) ).
In my model, all of the forward looking …rm decisions concerning entry, exit and incorporate a sunk cost component. I focus on the interaction between the …rm decisions to invest in capital stock, access external …nance, pay out dividends and/or retain pro…ts as cash within the …rm: in e¤ect, the nexus between real investment decisions and the key …nancing decisions of the …rm. The bene…t of investment is the accumulation of capital stock, with the actual realized capital stock stochastic. Given …rm heterogeneity, this leads to a sorting of …rms based on the dependence on external …nance and extent of investment. A change in …nancial development leads to a change in this sorting of …rms, and hence I focus on how this sorting changes during the transition to better …nancial development.
I characterize both the stationary equilibrium with stable cost to access external …nance, as well as the equilibrium transition path from a stationary equilibrium to another stationary equilibrium along any arbitrary path of …nancial development that changes the cost to access external …nance.
In particular, I compare the transition between the following stationary states: from restricted to undistorted access to external …nance; and from lax to undistorted access to external …nance. The transition dynamics are a¤ected by …rms factoring into current policy decisions the future evolution of cost of access to external …nance and the current and future policy decisions of other …rms. As the …rm policy decisions are a¤ected by sunk costs (irreversibility), although the end point of both transitions is the same the di¤erence in starting points deeply a¤ects the transition dynamics.
I rely on numerical methods to solve for these equilibria. I develop a general computational algorithm that can be used to solve a wide set of related dynamic industry evolution models. 1 I describe this algorithm in detail in the appendix.
Model Setup
As highlighted above, I develop the model to analyze the evolution of an industry comprised of heterogeneous …rms in response to an improvement in …nancial development. The …rms in the industry are distinguished by their productivity, capital stock and cash. Firm investment in capital stock plus current depreciated capital stock determines the …rm's target capital stock, with the actual capital stock achieved dependent on a stochastic shock. I focus on the interdependent …rm policies of investment, to increase capital stock, and …nancing, which includes use of external …nance, payment of dividends and holding of retained earnings as cash. Firm productivity is stochastic. Clearly, these policies are a¤ected by …nancial development that a¤ects the cost of external …nance. I focus on how …rm policy choices di¤er based on di¤erent starting points to the process of …nancial development. I analyze this model in a partial equilibrium setting with respect to the industry: I assume a demand system for the industry as a whole, and a perfectly elastic labor supply to the industry at the economy wide wage.
The core elements of the model are based on Hopenhayn (1992) , with the addition of investment to accumulate capital stock subject to …nancing decisions. The link between the …rm investment and …rm …nancing is related to the approach in Cooley and Quadrini (2001) . I then computationally solve this extended model for its stationary equilibrium along with any transition paths between two stationary states. The computational model is related to the one in Costantini (2006) and Costantini and Melitz (2007) . Across these models the basic algorithm for iterating towards an industry equilibrium in each stationary state and in the transition between stationary states is the same. The di¤erence is the particular set of …rm policies focused on and interaction with 1 These methods have also been concurrently used in Costantini (2006) to study the e¤ects of credit constraints on industrial evolution and in Costantini and Melitz (2007) to study the e¤ect of trade opening on industrial evolution. Similar methods applied to a continuous innovation decision in a general equilibrium setting have also recently been developed by Atkeson and Burstein (2006) . The computational methods I use in the current paper apply to a monopolistically competitive sector with a large number of competing …rms (where the mass of …rms evolves endogenously). Hence, these methods are radically di¤erent from the seminal contribution to the computation of such equilibria with a small number of …rms under oligopoly in Pakes and McGuire (1994) , following the development of the theoretical version of the model in Erikson and Pakes (1995) . institutional characteristics. 2 I next describe each part of the model, the equilibrium, and how I calibrate the model based on the empirical literature.
Demand
Consumer preferences for the di¤erentiated varieties in the industry are C.E.S. with elasticity > 1.
There is a continuum of varieties ! 2 . Let P t = R !2 p t (!) 1 1=(1 ) be the C.E.S. price index for the aggregated di¤erentiated good Q t R !2 q t (!) ( 1)= =( 1) at time t, where p t (!) and q t (!) are the price and quantity consumed of the individual varieties !. Total industry revenues are given by R = QP .
Production
Each variety is produced by a …rm with productivity v, capital stock z, and labor l. There are no frictions in the labor market, with the cost of a unit of labor, w, supplied inelastically by each of the L consumers normalized to unity. I normalize the price of capital to unity by appropriate choice of units, and capital is assumed to be available from a competitive market. Hence, total industry revenues R = wL.
Firms produce with a Cobb-Douglas technology, with weights v on productivity, z on capital and l on labor, along with an overhead per-period …xed cost F (measured in labor units). Given the demand system and a continuum of competing …rms, all …rms set a constant markup = ( 1)
over marginal cost. In each period, the …rm, conditional on its productivity and capital stock, optimizes production by hiring the required labor. 3 The per-period pro…t is:
The …rm's productivity evolves stochastically in each time period with a known martingale process. The …rm's capital stock is more involved, as resulting from both the …rm's choice of how much to invest, subject to available …nancing, and the stochastic evolution of current capital stock:
the next section describes this process more fully.
Capital Stock Evolution
The …rms'capital stock evolves within each time period as follows. First, the …rms'current capital stock depreciates by a factor z . Next, the …rm decides how much to invest in capital stock.
The …rm's choice of how much to invest is …nanced by accumulated internal funds and access to external …nance. In each period, the …rm has internally generated …nancial resources based on accumulated cash c t plus current pro…ts t . The accumulated cash resources earn interest at the rate of , which is the discount rate, from one period to the next.
If the …rm has positive internal …nancial resources, the …rm has a choice of how much to invest I t to increase capital stock, to retain as cash within the …rm for future use, and/or pay out as dividends d t . Cash retained and dividends are constrained to be not more than internal …nancial resources. However, investment may be more than current internal …nancial resources: in this case, the …rm accesses external …nance, e t , to …nance the di¤erence between the investment and internal …nancial resources, and the …rm's cash retained for future use and dividend are constrained to zero.
In e¤ect, the assumption is for a pecking order use of funding, with …rst use of internal funds and then use of external funds.
If the …rm has negative internal …nancial resources, the …rm must fund the shortfall by access to external …nance, and cash retained and dividends are constrained to be zero. 4 In this case if the …rm chooses to invest the …rm accesses external funds to cover the shortfall plus the desired level of investment.
The …rm's target future level of capital stock, z T t+1 , is thus given by z T t+1 = I t + (1 z )z t , where
(1 z )z t is the current capital stock remaining after depreciation. The actual level of next period capital stock, z t+1 , is based on an idiosyncratic shock based on a martingale process with mean at the target capital stock z T t+1 . 5 
External Finance
Firms have access to external …nance in the form of equity …nance with a cost wedge : speci…cally, the …rm's in ‡ow of external …nance t e t . This is represented as a negative dividend ‡ow d t = t e t < 0. Thus, for t = 1 there are no distortions to the cost of external …nance, as in a standard industrial organization model with no …nancial frictions: I refer to this as the undistorted case, as external …nance does not a¤ect …rm decisions. The case of t > 1 is when …rm's access to external …nance is costly: I refer to this as the restricted case. This is the typical case considered, as it represents a case of …nancial frictions in the provision of …nance. As t tends to in…nity this represents a shut-down of the provision of external …nance, as the cost becomes in…nite. As discussed above, the frictions could arise either because of information asymmetries, as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and/or limited rights of providers of external …nance, as in Hart and Moore (1984) . The case of 0 < t < 1 is when …rm's access to external …nance is subsidized: I refer to this as the lax case. This could be due to government subsidies or because investors provided …nance at lower cost than they should as, for instance, during a bubble, as during the Asia crisis, the internet boom, or the current credit crisis in the U.S..
This set up for the …rm's access to external …nance aims to be simple yet capture the essence of di¤erent …nancial scenarios. In particular, the three cases allow for comparison of the transition from restricted and lax states to the undistorted state: that is, of di¤erent paths for the improvement in …nancial institutions towards a non-distorted provision of external …nance.
Nonetheless, as is clear from the examples illustrating the restricted and lax cases, there would be value in considering separately equity and debt, as well as di¤erent types of underlying problems.
Clearly, this would substantially complicate the model. For instance, the introduction of debt would require interest rates on the debt to be set endogenously to re ‡ect the situation of the …rm borrowing and the amount borrowed. More generally, there are many di¤erent ways in which the …nancial sector could be distorted, both in the provision of external equity as well as debt. The aim in this paper is to highlight the di¤erence to the transition to a better …nancial system dependent on the starting point. Hence, the value of considering these simple scenarios of di¤erent types of distortions.
Hence, with the current set up dividends are given by:
where
Lax state then 0 < t > 1
Undistorted state then t = 1
Restricted state then t > 1
Value Functions and Firm Policy Decisions
I next discuss the …rm policy decisions. Within each time period, the timing of events is as follows, as illustrated in Figure 1 . First, …rms decide whether to continue in the industry or exit. This is based on the maximization of …rm value V t (v; z; c), with subscripts on the arguments dropped where this does not cause confusion. The …rm compares the value of continuing, V C t (v; z; c), to the value of exit V L t (v; z; c):
As discussed above, continuing …rms maximize their value by optimally choosing investment and dividends. Firms discount next period pro…ts at the exogenous rate , and internalize the exogenous probability of a death-inducing shock (which is independent of productivity v, capital z, or cash c). 6 The …rm policy choices must satisfy the Bellman equation:
Restricted state then t > 1 6 Thus, there is both endogenous exit (due to a bad productivity shock) and exogenous exit due to the death shock.
Also, the value of exit is V L t (v; z; c) = L z +c, with L a parameter for the proportion of capital sold when the …rm liquidates (with the remaining 1 L proportion of capital scrapped).
The …rm policies are thus whether to exit and, if continuing, what investment to make and dividends to pay. Hence, the set of optimal …rm policies arising from (4) vary across the set of states (v; z; c). The optimal policies may be summarized by partitioning the set of states (v; z; c)
into regions each with similar type of optimal policy. A …rst distinction is between the exit region and the continuation region. The exit region comprises for each capital stock and cash combination (z; c) the set of low enough productivity levels (v) that make exit optimal, with the upper bound being the cuto¤ exit productivity. Note that considering a given level of cash, c, the exit boundary given by the cuto¤ exit productivity may vary with capital stock depending on the cost to access external …nance.
If access to external …nance is undistorted, then the exit boundary should vary little with capital stock. A …rm contemplating whether to increase capital stock will be indi¤erent to whether this is funded by internal or external funds (as these cost the same). Nonetheless, capital stock is subject to sunk costs. Capital stock may not be sold o¤ by the …rm but just decreased through gradual depreciation and at exit only part of the value of the capital stock is recovered. Hence, there is likely to be some variation in productivity exit boundary across capital stock levels at a given level of cash.
The exit region of the restricted and lax cases di¤er. In the lax case, a …rm with low level of capital stock will choose to continue when the …rm is at productivity levels that would trigger exit were access to external …nance restricted. The di¤erence across scenarios is explained by considering the three components of …rm value a¤ecting this decision: the value of exit, the value due to current pro…ts and the value in future time periods. The value of exit does not depends on cost of external …nance. The value due to current pro…ts is similar as at low levels of capital stock …rms have negative pro…ts, with the magnitude largely determined by the …xed cost. Hence, in the lax case, the value in future time periods is higher. In part this is due to the lower cost of external …nance incurred to accumulate capital. In addition, in the lax case, relative to the restricted case, a …rm is less likely to exit while attempting to grow, as the exit boundary is at lower productivity levels, thus increasing the value of continuation. That is, in the lax case the option to grow to larger capital stock levels is more valuable than in the restricted case.
The set of continuation states may be subdivided into regions based on the type of …rm policy.
For example, …rms that access external funds both to fund de…cit and to grow capital stock: hence, these are …rms with negative pro…tability and for which it is optimal to invest to grow capital stock (as opposed to just investing to maintain stable level of capital stock, not investing and allowing capital stock to depreciate, or exiting). A second example of a region is for …rms that are pro…table but with optimal investment levels above current pro…ts thus requiring external funding. A third example of a region is for …rms for which optimal investment just replaces depreciated capital stock to maintain stable size, and with …rm pro…ts high enough (as …rm productivity and/or capital stock is high enough) that current pro…ts fund investment and enable dividend payout. These regions highlight how within the model set up the optimal …rm policies re ‡ect the basic evolution of …rm dynamics. Smaller …rms require external funds to survive and grow. If the …rm reaches su¢ cient size and productivity, external …nancial dependence ceases and the …rm pays out dividends. During the …rm's growth a su¢ ciently bad evolution of …rm productivity results in …rm exit.
Changes in the costs of external …nance a¤ects the size and shape of each of these regions, thus a¤ecting …rm dynamics while preserving the basic underlying process of small …rms aiming to grow to large …rms. The prior discussion highlighted the changes in the exit region with changes in access to external …nance. These and other changes to the regions due to changes in cost to access to external …nance will be discussed below in more detail with the simulation results.
Entrants
At the start of each period, new entrants can potentially enter the industry. An entrant pays a sunk cost of entry, S, then realizes its initial productivity draw from a known invariant distribution G E (v; z; c), and pays the value of the initial capital stock and cash. Entry is not otherwise restricted.
Entrants arrive into the industry with cash set to zero, and a range of initial productivity and capital stock levels. Thereon, entrants are indistinguishable from incumbent …rms with the same productivity, capital stock and cash. A prospective entrant therefore faces a net value of entry
When this value is negative, entry is unpro…table.
Equilibrium
Let v;z;c;t represent the measure function for producing …rms over states (v; z; c) in period t. This function summarizes all information on the distribution of producing …rms across productivity levels, as well as the total mass of producing …rms in state (v; z; c), M v;z;c;t = v;z;c;t ( ). A dynamic equilibrium is characterized by a time path for the price index fP t g, the measure of …rms in each state, f v;z;c;t g, and the mass of entrants fM E;t g. Note that a choice of fP t g uniquely determines the time path for fV C t (v; z; c)g and thus determines all the optimal choices for any …rm, given its productivity v, capital stock z and cash c. An equilibrium fP t g, f v;z;c;t g, and fM E;t g must then satisfy the following three conditions:
Firm Value Maximization All …rms' choices for exit/continuation, and, if continuing, for investment and dividends, conditional on v, z and c, must satisfy (3) and (4). In the aggregate, this means that v;z;c;t is entirely determined by v;z;c;t 1 and the choices for fP t g and fM E;t g.
Starting with a mass and distribution of …rms at time t 1, a share of …rms receive the exogenous death shock. The remaining (1 ) share of …rms update capital stock and cash, based on choice of investment and dividends and the realization of the capital stock shock, and also update productivity based on the realization of the productivity shock. To these …rms are added the M E;t new entrants, with a distribution determined by G E (v; z; c). All …rms then make their endogenous exit decisions. The remaining …rms result in a distribution and mass of …rms for every state. In equilibrium this must match the chosen v;z;c;t .
Free Entry In equilibrium, the net value of entry V E t must be non-positive, since there is an unbounded pool of prospective entrants and entry is not limited beyond the sunk entry cost and cost of initial capital stock and cash. Furthermore, entry must be zero whenever V E t is negative.
Aggregate Industry Accounting The mass and distribution of …rms over productivity levels (aggregating over states) implies a mass and distribution of prices (applying the pro…t maximizing markup rule to …rm marginal cost). Aggregating these prices into the C.E.S. price index must yield the chosen P t in every period.
Stationary Equilibrium
A time invariant level of external …nance cost leads to a stationary equilibrium with a time invariant price index P , measure of …rms v;z;c , and mass of entrants M E . In such a stationary equilibrium, entry must be positive since there is always an exogenous component to exit. Thus V E t must be zero in this equilibrium. Although an equal mass of …rms enter and exit, their distributions over productivity, capital stock and cash will not generally match. This is due to the productivity transition dynamics among incumbent …rms and the investment and …nancing choices of …rms. Jointly, these productivity, capital stock and cash transitions, along with the distribution of entrants and exiting …rms, lead to a stationary distribution of …rms for every state.
Equilibrium Along Transition to Improved Financial Development I compare two scenarios that entail a transition towards an improved access to external …nance from di¤erent starting points. The two scenarios are a transition from the restricted to undistorted scenarios (i.e., decreasing from above one down to one), and from lax to undistorted scenarios (i.e., increasing from below one up to one). The scenarios have period 1 as a stationary state, in which …rms expect the cost of external …nance and other parameters to remain stable over time.
Depending on the scenario, this is either the restricted or lax case. At the end of period 1, …rms are informed that starting from period 13 the cost to access external …nance will change to the unconstrained scenario: that is, there is a step change in the cost to access external …nance from period 12 to period 13. As there is a pre-announcement of the change in cost of external …nance …rms have the opportunity to shape their policy decisions in anticipation of the forthcoming changes in costs of external …nance. From period 13 onwards the cost of external …nance is the undistorted case. Over subsequent periods the equilibrium gradually converges towards the stationary state equilibrium of the undistorted case. In particular, I consider a su¢ ciently long time period such that by the …nal period, the industry is arbitrarily close to its stationary equilibrium consistent with the undistorted cost of external …nance.
Thus, a summary description of the total long-run change in the industry is provided by a comparison of the stationary states generated by the initial and …nal set of parameters. The equilibrium path for the price index fP t g, measure of …rms f v;z;v;t g, and entrants fM E;t g will thus begin at their initial stationary levels until a change in costs of external …nance is announced, then follow a transition path until they reach the new stationary state levels, and remain constant thereafter. During the transition, as opposed to the stationary states, the net value of entry may be negative resulting in periods of zero entry.
Calibration
I search for the equilibrium paths of fP t g, f v;z;c;t g, and fM E;t g using numerical methods. The appendix provides a description of the algorithm used. In essence: I …rst compute the values of P; v;z;c , and M E in the initial and …nal stationary equilibria. The algorithm then iterates over candidate equilibrium paths for fP t g and fM E;t g. The choice for fP t g determines all of the policy choices for any incumbent …rm (this is the crucial bene…t of abstracting from strategic interactions in the monopolistic competition equilibrium). Since v;z;c in the initial stationary state is known, I
can thus compute f v;z;c;t g based on those policy choices, and the choice for the number of entrants. In turn, I can then compute a new price index fP t g based on the distribution and mass of …rms (which implies a distribution of prices). I iterate until this new price path fP t g matches the prior choice of the candidate fP t g. I …rst describe the grid over time periods, productivity levels and capital stock on which to run the model (Table 1) . I set each time period to correspond to one month. This is relatively short thus smoothening out the dynamic processes. I set the total number of time periods to 100 (i.e., around 8 years) as this is long enough to ensure that by the …nal period the industry has converged close to the stationary equilibrium corresponding to the …nal set of parameters. Note that I do not impose this …nal stationary state as the end point: rather, I allow the industry to evolve towards it.
I have the cost of external …nance varying over time with the following set up. The change in cost of external …nance is announced at the end of period 1, and the change occurs in period 13.
That is, there is a step-change in the cost of external …nance. . This grid size is exogenous to any …rm decisions. The grid is set wide enough such that the exit cuto¤s are su¢ ciently above the lower bound. I set the number of grid points to 15x15x5 = 1125; high enough that there are su¢ cient grid points to reduce any e¤ects from the discreteness of the grid. For instance, a …ner grid allows for the productivity cuto¤s to more smoothly adjust over time.
I next discuss the demand and production parameters (see Table 2 for details). The main demand parameters is the elasticity of substitution between varieties, which I set to = 4. The weights of the Cobb-Douglas production function are: productivity v = 1=6, capital stock z = 3=6, and labour l = 2=6, with an overhead cost F = 9. Throughout the calibration I set the capital stock variables such that capital stock has a high share in production but depreciates fast. This is in part to capture a broad de…nition of capital, for instance including working capital.
I set the range of costs of external …nance variable to = 5 for the restricted case, = 0:2 for the lax case, and = 1 for the undistorted case. The restricted and lax states are set at fairly extreme values to highlight the e¤ects.
Next I discuss my choices for the productivity transitions (see Table 3 ). First the death shock:
I set this at 15% per year, which is higher than the …rm level exit rates observed empirically (of around 3-7% per year).
I set the stochastic productivity transition based on a lognormal distribution. For each …rm, the draw is from a distribution with mean corresponding to the current …rm's productivity. The standard deviation is the same across all …rms (with truncation of extreme changes in productivity, in part to avoid accumulation of …rms at the edge of the productivity grid). Thus each …rm has the same probability of experiencing a similar percent increase or decline in productivity 7 . I set the stochastic evolution of capital stock based on a lognormal distribution, with mean corresponding to the …rm's target capital stock and with truncation of extreme outcomes.
Finally, I specify the distribution of potential entrants over productivity levels as lognormal with log(3) mean and 2 standard deviation, and over capital stock as lognormal with log(0:3) mean and 2 standard deviation, and initial cash to zero. The endogenous exit productivity cuto¤s will always be above the :2 productivity lower bound so that some entrants with low productivity draws around this cuto¤ choose to immediately exit and not produce. Overall, in the simulations, entrants enter with an average productivity lower than that of incumbent …rms. Thus, the simulations replicate the robust empirical …ndings that recent entrants are on average smaller, and exhibit higher exit rates than incumbent …rms. The entry sunk cost is set to S = 60, which is equivalent to a per-period interest charge of 3% of …xed costs (at the 5% annual discount rate ).
Simulated Results
I …rst describe the numerical properties of the three stationary states: the undistorted, restricted, and lax cases, respectively with = 1, = 5, and = 0:2. In each case, in equilibrium the speci…c …rm policies depends on the …rm's productivity, capital stock and cash. Within the continuation region, the …rm's investment and dividend polices change with changes in the state variables. This gives rise to regions of the state space within which …rms pursue similar types of policies. In particular, four main regions comprise the continuation space within the simulation results, characterized by whether or not external funds are accessed, the use of external funds, and whether or not the …rm is seeking to grow. One region has …rms that access to external funds to fund de…cit and to grow capital stock (this is region 1 in Figure 3 ). These are smaller …rms with negative pro…tability that want to grow. For instance, most entrants are in this region. At the other extreme, another region is with …rms that do not use external funds, just internal funds, and aim to maintain stable capital stock. This is for …rms that have grown to high levels of capital stock and high productivity generating high current pro…ts that provide enough funds to replace depreciating stock and payout dividends (this is region 4 in Figure 3 ). In terms of …rm dynamics, these two regions are the typical start for small entrants and the …nal region for …rms that have successfully grown. Along the growth path of …rms, the …rms may enter other regions (including the exit region). For instance, another region is with …rms that are currently pro…table and aim to grow capital stock, typically requiring access to external …nance (this is region 2 in Figure 3 ).
Another region has …rms that access external funds to fund de…cit, as pro…tability is negative, but with investment only aiming to maintain stable capital stock. These are …rms typically close to the exit boundary for which aggressive growth in capital stock is not warranted as productivity is low (this is region 3 in Figure 3 ).
The relative location of these regions in state space does not change, as this is largely driven by the basic underlying …rm dynamics of small …rms that enter the industry and then grow through a process of additions to capital stock, in part determined by the …rm and in part stochastic, and stochastic evolution of productivity. This results in a range of …rm dynamics, including exit and growth to become large, productive …rms.
Nonetheless, comparing across the external …nance scenarios, the size and shape of these regions changes. As the cost of external …nance increases, there is an expansion of the set of states in which it is optimal for …rms to invest to maintain capital stock and payout dividends out of pro…ts, with no access to external …nance (this is region 4). Also, as the cost of external …nance increases, the exit boundary shifts. At low levels of capital stock, the higher the cost of external …nance, the greater the range of productivity levels falling into the exit regions. At high levels of capital stock, the narrower the range of productivity levels falling into the exit region. This is re ‡ected in the distribution of …rms: most of the di¤erence across scenarios is in the distribution of …rms across capital stock, less so across productivity levels (Figure 4 ). In particular, for the distribution across capital stock, the lax case has more small, more large and less medium size …rms as compared to the restricted case. That is, the lax case has a distribution across capital stock that is more skewed towards the extremes, as compared to the lax case, and hence the cumulative distributions for the restricted and lax cases cross at intermediate levels of capital stock. The undistorted case is intermediate to the restricted and lax cases. The distribution of …rms across productivity levels is more similar across scenarios as a fundamental driver is the evolution of productivity shocks, which does not change across scenarios.
Hence, in equilibrium, the distribution of …rms in the lax case, relative to the restricted case, is over a broader set of productivity levels, as the exit region is smaller, with a greater proportion of low productivity, low capital stock …rms and a greater proportion of high productivity, high capital stock …rms: this is summarized in Figure 5 . Hence, in the lax case, relative to the restricted case, a greater proportion of new entrants continue in the industry as opposed to exiting. Also, these continuing …rms face a lower chance of subsequent exit as the exit region is smaller. These changes in dynamics raise the expected value of entry. However, in equilibrium the expected value of entry is the same as there is common sunk cost of entry across scenarios. Hence, in equilibrium the overall price level is lower in the lax case: consequently the equilibrium number of …rms is larger in the lax case than in the restricted case.
The comparison of the stationary states corresponding to the restricted, lax and undistorted scenarios highlights that in considering the transition from the restricted to undistorted scenarios, and from the lax to undistorted scenarios, key aspects relate to the evolution of the exit boundary, change in number of …rms over time, and path of the aggregate price level. In the stationary states the number of entrants is always positive (as there is forced exit through the death shock).
However, the extent of changes across scenarios in the exit boundary and number of …rms indicate potentially interesting changes in number of entrants over time, including periods of zero entry:
this is indeed the case, as is discussed in the next section focused on the transition over time.
Transition from Restricted to Undistorted Scenarios: Reduction in Cost to Access External Finance
In this section I describe the transition from the restricted scenario to the undistorted scenario.
In the next section I describe the transition from the lax scenario to the undistorted scenario, and then compare the two transition paths. In the restricted case = 5, representing a state of poor …nancial development in that access to external …nance is much more costly than use of internal funds. The transition is to the undistorted state = 1, in which there is no cost to external …nance and hence access to funding does not distort …rm decisions. The evolution of the external …nance cost is level at = 5 for periods 1 to 12, and then = 1, from period 13 on, with the change in announced at the end of period 1: that is, this is an anticipated, abrupt lowering of the cost of external …nance. As time periods correspond to one month, the anticipation period corresponds to one year.
As described above, the model numerically solves for …rm policies for each month. To illustrate the transition I show in Figure 7 the exit region, summary …rm size distribution and total number of …rms for selected time periods before the change in (periods 1, 6 and 12) and after the change in (periods 13 and 24) . Also, I show the stationary state towards which the equilibrium converges in the long run (labelled as period 101). In addition, I present in Figure 8 the evolution of the price index P t and number of entrants M E;t over all time periods.
In the long-run the number of …rms rises, however initially, up to period 12, the number of …rms decreases and then, from period 13 onwards, rises. Similarly, the price index overshoots, rising until period 12 and then in period 13 dropping abruptly to the long run average. The exit region changes somewhat before period 12, and then rapidly changes in period 13 to be very similar to the long-run exit region. Also, entry is zero up to period 12, then there is a spike in entry in period 13 followed by a gradual reduction in entry towards the long-run level.
Initially incumbent …rms face, over the long run, a decrease in the cost of external …nance and a decrease in prices and hence some …rms exit: the exit region expands. Consequently, the value of entry declines, as the likelihood of continuation decreases. Indeed, the decline in the continuation value for entrants is su¢ cient to drive expected value from entry to below zero, leading to zero entry. Thus by period 12 there are fewer …rms than in period 1, and much less than the number of …rms in the new long-run stationary equilibrium. Once falls, in period 13, there is su¢ cient entry to drive the price index down close to the long-run level. This level of entry is above the long-run level of entry and hence the total number of …rms rises. Over subsequent periods this pattern continues with entry and total number of …rms converging towards their long-run levels.
Transition from Lax to Undistorted Scenarios: Increase in Cost to Access External Finance
In this section I describe the transition from the lax scenario to the undistorted scenario, and then compare the two transition paths. In the lax case = 0:2, representing a state of poor …nancial development in that access to external …nance is subsidized relative to the cost of internal funds.
The transition is to the undistorted state = 1, in which there is no cost to external …nance and hence access to funding does not distort …rm decisions. The evolution of the external …nance cost is level at = 0:2 for periods 1 to 12, and then = 1, from period 13 on, with the change in announced at the end of period 1: that is, this is an anticipated, abrupt rise in the cost of external …nance. As time periods correspond to one month, the anticipation period corresponds to one year.
As above, to illustrate the transition I show in Figure 6 the exit region, summary …rm size distribution and total number of …rms for selected time periods before the change in (periods 1, 6 and 12) and after the change in (periods 13, 24) . Also, I show the stationary state towards which the equilibrium converges in the long run (labelled as period 101). In addition, I present in Figure 8 the evolution of the price index P t and number of entrants M E;t over all time periods.
The transition from lax to undistorted is characterized by a very di¤erent pattern as compared to the transition from restricted to undistorted. In the transition from lax to undistorted there is gradual change in exit cuto¤ and number of …rms, with the changes starting post announcement and before the rise in cost of external …nance , see Figure 6 . In contrast, the price index jumps up mostly from period 12 to 13 when changes, with some gradual rise in the price index before and after the jump. Entry gradually declines up to period 12, and is then zero until period 22, before rising gradually towards the long-run …nal stationary state level. The period of zero entry is evident in Figure 6 in the period 13 picture in the white area in which …rms have low capital stock and high productivity.
In this transition, the long run shift is towards an industry with higher average price level and fewer …rms. The rise in price levels and rise in cost to access external …nance induces incumbent …rms to remain in the industry and entrants to continue to enter (before the rise in ). Nonetheless, some …rms right on the exit boundary choose to exit in anticipation of the change in cost of external …nance. These are …rms su¢ ciently far from the exit boundary that will prevail after the drop in that these …rms do not …nd it optimal to stay in the industry in the hope an improvement in productivity (and investment in capital stock would not necessarily shift them closer to the new long-run continuation region). Hence, the exit boundary shifts ahead of the rise in . Despite these …rms exiting, more …rms remain in the industry as of period 13 relative to the number in the new long run stationary state. The over-hang of …rms just after the drop in results in a price level lower than in the long-run. This lower price level reduces the value of entry su¢ ciently that entry drops to zero. Entry starts again once the the number of …rms has reduced enough (due to ongoing exit) to result in a su¢ cient rise in the price index.
In summary, two key di¤erences across the transition scenarios are that for a transition from lax to undistorted the price index and number of …rms adjusts monotonically, whereas for the transition from restricted to undistorted there is overshooting of the price index. Also, the pattern of entry is very di¤erent, in particular zero entry occurs before the drop in cost of external …nance, for the transition from restricted to undistorted, whereas zero entry occurs after the rise in cost of external …nance, for the transition from lax to undistorted.
Conclusion
In this paper, I build a dynamic model of …rm-level adjustment to …nancial development that jointly addresses …rm's decisions investment and …nancing decisions. I analyze the equilibrium transition from two di¤erent initial stationary states of poor …nancial development, to a …nal state of good …nancial development. I represent good …nancial development as there being no cost to access external …nance: hence, …rm's policies are not distorted by …nancing decisions. I consider two types of poor …nancial development in which …rm policies are distorted. In one case, access to external …nance is costly, thus use is restricted. In the other case, external …nance is lower cost than in the undistorted case: there is lax provision of …nance. I …nd the transition from restricted to undistorted access to external …nance is very di¤erent to the transition from lax to undistorted access to external …nance. Major di¤erences in …rm policies are evident in how …rm entry and exit decisions change over time: in particular, the extent to which entry and exit is a¤ected in anticipation of or after a change in …nancial development. Also, the evolution of average industry price and the number of …rms over the short-term period immediately around the change in cost of external …nance is not necessarily indicative of the long run change. These e¤ects highlight the importance of considering dynamic e¤ects in assessing the e¤ect of changes in …nancial constraints, as the e¤ects of a change in …nancial development may not be concurrent with the change in …nancial development. More generally the results indicate the substantial e¤ect of changes in institutional development on …rm dynamics, in this case improvement in …nancial institutions. 
Appendix

A Model Algorithm
Following we describe the algorithm for numerically solving the model, focusing on the equilibrium conditions required and the sequence of calculations performed. The demand structure leads to monopolistic competition. In particular, this means that each …rm in each time period t need only know industry aggregate outcomes for industry price P from time t onwards, fP t ; :::; P T g, to determine its speci…c policies conditional on its current productivity v, capital stock z, and cash c.
Firm policy choices are whether to fContinue; Exitg, and, if continuing, how much to invest, and whether to access external …nance, pay out dividends or retain cash.
The algorithm comprise three steps.
Step 1 is to set parameters.
Step 2 is to compute the …rm policies and …rm-size distribution v;z;c;1 corresponding to the initial parameter values, the initial stationary state equilibrium at t = 1. Within Step 2, there is an iteration over the aggregate price for the stationary state P 1 .
Step 3 computes the …rm policies and …rm-size distribution for the evolution from the initial stationary state through to period T . Within the Step 3, there is an iteration over the price path fP 2 ; :::; P T g.
1)
Set initial parameters, including for industry characteristics and grid structure.
2) P 1 iteration:
Choose candidate value for P 1 .
Firm Value and Policy Iteration:
-Compute pro…t (v; z) at each productivity v and capital stock z, based on the speci…c demand system and production function chosen.
-Pick a candidate value function V 1 (v; z; c).
-Determine fContinuation=Exitg and choice of policy for investment and …nancing at each fv; z; cg.
-The set of …rm policies over continuation and choice of policy state imply a next iteration value for the value function, V 0 1 (v; z; c), based on computing the value of continuing and comparing to the value of exit.
-Check whether new V 0 1 (v; z; c) is su¢ ciently close to V 1 (v; z; c).
If not, continue iteration with V 0 1 (v; z; c).
If close enough, return to P 1 iteration.
Check the value of entry. As seek equilibria with positive entry the condition should be close to zero. Compute …rm-size distribution v;z;c;1 .
-If close enough to zero, P 1 iteration is complete.
-If not, then adjust candidate P 1 accordingly: if condition is positive lower P 1 , if negative raise P 1 .
3) fP 2 ; :::; P T g iteration:
Choose candidate value for fP 2 ; :::; P T g.
-Compute price corresponding to stationary state at …nal parameter values.
-Set initial guess for fP 2 ; :::; P T g based on prices corresponding to initial and …nal parameter values. If close enough, return to fP 2 ; :::; P T g iteration.
If not, continue iteration with V 0 T (v; z; c).
-Firm Value and Policy Iteration for t = f2; :::; T 1g:
Compute pro…t t (v; c) at each productivity v and capital stock z, based on the speci…c demand system and production function chosen.
Iterate back to compute V T 1 (v; z; c) based on t (v; z) and V 0 T (v; z; c), and period T policies, based on computing the value of continuing and comparing to the value of exit. Hence, determine period T 1 policies fContinuation=Exitg and choice of policy for investment and …nancing at each fv; z; cg.
Iterate back to period t = 2.
Compute value of entry in each time period t = f2; :::; T 1g.
Compute the size-distribution of …rms v;z;c = f v;z;c;2 ; :::; v;z;c;T g consistent with the computed …rm policies.
-Compute v;z;c;2 based on v;z;c;1 and …rm policies computed for t = 2.
-Determine number of entrants:
If value of entry negative for t = 2, set entry to zero.
If value of entry is non-negative, set entry such that: Case 1: If the distribution of incumbents implies a price below P 2 then entry is zero, as adding entrants would further distance the …rm distribution from the current value of price path Case 2: If the distribution of incumbents implies a price above P 2 , then add entrants until the …rm distribution (including entrants) implies a price equal to Check whether price path fP 2 ; :::; P T g is close enough to an equilibrium:
-Objective function to assess equilibrium comprised of two parts:
The …rst part measures the distance between the price path and …rm distribution:
The second part measures an equivalent gap based on the value of entry: (P f e P ). This is zero if value of entry is negative (to capture instances when this value is close to zero but negative, we consider this to be zero if value of entry/sunk cost of entry is larger than 10 4 ). This is negative if the value of entry is positive. We calculate P f e as what the price in the time period in question would need to change to in order to close part of the gap in value of free entry. Hence, if value of entry is positive the price change is negative so as to lower pro…tability and thus lower the value of entry. The adjustment is moderated by the extent to which price adjustments for future periods (which have been determined as the algorithm work backs through time periods) are for increases or decreases in prices.
The objective function is then the Euclidian distance of these two measures: ((P max P ) 2 + (P f e P ) 2 ) The suggested price adjustment is the average of (P max P ) and (P f e P ).
The actual price adjustment is only part of the suggested price adjustment, to reduce the risk of cycling over successive iterations of the price path.
